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In “The End of the Imagination” Arundhati Roy frames her protest 
against globalization as a defence of aesthetics. She contrasts global 
development and nuclear proliferation with an alternative—beauty. 
“There is beauty yet in this brutal, damaged world of ours,” she writes. 
“Hidden, fierce, immense. Beauty that is uniquely ours and beauty that 
we have received with race from others, enhanced, reinvented, and made 
our own. We have to seek it out, nurture it, love it” (Cost 123). Roy uses 
affective terms, portraying those who resist technocracy as protectively 
maternal, rather than as critically distanced. And although she depicts 
resistance as a collective enterprise—this is “our own beauty”—her 
description evokes the intersubjective but private encounter between 
mother and child, not the publicity of protest. Roy invokes an embod-
ied, affective experience only to refute its political efficacy. But while 
her own stance straddles the two positions, she depicts them as sepa-
rate modes of thought—politics and aesthetics. Because her political 
claims depend on an assertion of aesthetics as a separate sphere, Roy’s 
work offers an opportunity to evaluate the relevance of aesthetics to 
the overtly political intersection of postcolonial, anti-globalization, and 
environmentalist writing. 
Advocacy of aesthetic autonomy raises immediate concerns in a post-
colonial context. For one, if the aesthetic has primarily affective, subjec-
tive resonance, does it imply nostalgia for “pre-theoretical innocence” 
(Armstrong 2) or initiate a retreat from political discourse? (Roy’s prefer-
ence for protesting “empire” rather than “globalization” might suggest 
that she rejects the evolution of the discourse, at the very least.1) Does 
the concept of aesthetic pleasure invoke naïve subjectivism and ignore 
the cultural and discursive forces that shape subjectivity? Such privileg-
ing of subjective experience might permit the renewal of cultural essen-
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tialism and self-exoticization (Massumi 2), which postcolonial studies 
long worked to critique. Moreover, separating aesthetics and politics 
might reinforce “binarized, highly moralistic allegories of the subver-
sive versus the hegemonic, resistance versus power” (Sedgwick 100) that 
valorize experiences associated with powerlessness without posing solu-
tions.2 But finally, if the purpose of positioning aesthetics as in dialogue 
with and yet fundamentally separate from political discourse is to find a 
source of affective solidarity among the oppressed, it is worth examining 
whether the re-emergence of aesthetics can usefully alter the terms of 
political engagement.
In Roy’s case, “beauty” provides the basis for a politicized human-
ism that contests the critiques of cultural compromise and assertions 
of unapproachable otherness typical of both postcolonial and ecocriti-
cal discourse. Nonetheless, she maintains a tension between aesthetic 
autonomy and political engagement rather than integrating them. Roy 
locates the search for beauty in private encounters between marginalized 
individuals and the environment. Thus, she foregrounds not the perceiv-
er’s power or demand for political recognition, but her embeddedness 
in a living but largely non-human world—her ecological solidarity.3 In 
The God of Small Things, Roy offers the aesthetic as an alternative poli-
tics, but also an alternative to cultural politics because she portrays the 
sensory pleasures her fragile characters and narrator share as negating 
socio-historical agency.4 Since the novel’s resistance to agency operates 
by representing characters already excluded from political participation 
(for reasons of age, caste and gender), the private experience of finding 
beauty in the world might seem elegiac or merely consolatory.5 In order 
to secure this exclusion, the novel enacts a division between imagina-
tive and critical energies, as when the narrator describes how “[n]ow 
that he’d been re-Returned, Estha walked .  .  . along the banks of the 
river that smelled of shit and pesticides bought with World Bank loans” 
(14). Though the narrator is close to Estha’s perspective at the begin-
ning of the sentence, Estha is emotionally arrested at age seven and not 
equipped with the political awareness needed to perform this critique 
of the World Bank. As far as both Estha and Rahel are concerned, the 
riverbank is their world. Here and elsewhere the novel differentiates 
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between two modes: a public narrator who decries pollution and sar-
donically comments that “a five-star hotel chain had bought the Heart 
of Darkness” (109), and a private narrator who harmonizes with her 
characters to make beauty a still vibrant possibility. This tension runs 
throughout Roy’s writings.
The novel’s aesthetic and political commitments have been misun-
derstood for two reasons. First, Roy is interpreted as advocating a form 
of hybrid cosmopolitan subjectivity rather than a universal, humanistic 
conception of subjectivity. Second, The God of Small Things is often not 
read in the context of her political writing, which retains the novel’s in-
vestments while leaving behind its dead ends. As I will argue, The God of 
Small Things valorizes embodied intersubjectivity, generating what Isobel 
Armstrong terms a “radical aesthetic.” Despite her stress on aesthetic ex-
perience, then, Roy’s interests are also political, since the story of the 
twins’ tragic movement from childhood to adulthood is contextualized 
by protest. Most critics argue that it is unclear how the novel’s social 
realism and its aestheticism relate, but acknowledge that Roy’s political 
career after writing the novel makes the question of the relation between 
aesthetics and politics particularly salient.6 Ultimately, I argue, Roy’s 
body of work insists that the primacy of subjective experience is a limit 
that politics must face as well as a limit that divides Roy’s own public life. 
The tension Roy maintains between aesthetic autonomy and political 
agency is especially crucial to anti-globalization protest because globali-
zation so threatens the kinds of experience a radical aesthetic values most. 
I.
Understanding Roy’s work as a project in aesthetics may seem to ignore 
the critical debate about whether the novel should be understood as 
advocating the kind of authentic conception of experience discredited 
by postcolonial criticism. Numerous critics have worried that the novel’s 
style gets in the way of acknowledging the compromises that globaliza-
tion has imposed upon cultural and personal authenticity.7 Addressing 
these doubts, Alex Tickell argues that The God of Small Things is a cos-
mopolitan text drawing stylistically on what Homi Bhabha, in The 
Location of Culture, terms “hybridity.” As a source of destabilization and 
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dissent in narratives of cultural difference, stylistic and thematic hybrid-
ity enables critique of cultural authenticity and celebration of decentred 
multiplicity (Tickell 82). In The God of Small Things, Tickell explains, 
Roy cultivates a deliberately unstable conception of personal and cul-
tural identity: she “draws the reader into a text ‘woven with little frag-
ments of ordinary language contrasted and folded unexpectedly against 
each other’ that ‘begin to sing in our ears as they gather, with each rep-
etition, the whole emotional charge of the narrative’; in these instances 
Roy depends on a brilliant ‘over-written layering of tone and detail, 
as much as she does on ironic narrative effect’” (81; quoting Ahmad, 
103).8 Certainly “ironic narrative effect” and the accretion of emotional 
power fuse in Roy’s hyperactive layering of narrative modes. But how 
does layered narrative produce emotional power? 
The novel in fact depends on authenticity—on connections between 
childhood subjectivity, emotional power, and narrative affect that rely 
on a conception of childhood that renders cosmopolitanism an un-
satisfactory explanation for the novel’s politics. From a cosmopolitan 
perspective, the figure of the child seems to be a troublesome bastion 
of essentialism. The novel grants the status of what I would term a phe-
nomenology to the playful way of seeing the world associated in the 
novel with childhood. The narrator’s adoption of this phenomenology, 
however, does not show it directly contesting the political issues the 
novel raises (caste conflict, cultural sexism, local Marxist politics, the 
World Bank’s environmental projects). Instead, it becomes a way to cul-
tivate solidarity with the powerless, affective and visionary but would 
not necessarily imply more concrete political agency.
Missing from a cosmopolitan interpretation, then, is an investigation 
of the novel’s aesthetic commitments. Not only does the novel’s phe-
nomenology counteract postcolonial theory’s valorization of the hybrid 
subject, but Roy’s work also builds an environmentalist, anti-globaliza-
tion politics out of this phenomenology while retaining its always per-
sonal resonance. Though it depicts cultural cross-pollination, The God of 
Small Things is not fundamentally invested in hybrid cultural identity, 
but in hybridity as ecological multiplicity. Thus the narrative is inter-
ested less in postcolonial political agency than in partaking of childlike 
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subjectivity’s necessary but often futile struggle to escape oppression pri-
marily through recourse to beauty discovered in the environment, and 
only secondarily through culture or ideology. The novel perpetuates the 
authenticity of childhood subjectivity that attaches value to the contem-
plation of beautiful “things”—other living beings in the world.9 
The narrator speaks in the third rather than first person, yet incor-
porates thoughts and images attributed indiscriminately to Rahel and 
Estha. Taking up the children’s mental language, the narrator recapitu-
lates the doubleness of the twins’ shared subjectivity, which emphasizes 
the interactive responsiveness of play. For instance, the children’s quarrel 
before going to the airport—he calls her “stick insect,” she calls him 
“Elvis the Pelvis”—takes on a narrative life of its own, intermingled 
with the adults’ insistence that they act as “ambassadors”: “Ambassador 
E. Pelvis whispered in Ambassador S. Insect’s ear. Ambassador Rahel’s 
giggle escaped in a bluegreen bubble (the color of a jackfruit fly) and 
burst in the hot airport air. Pffft! was the sound it made” (138). The 
negative feelings affiliated with being dubbed “ambassadors,” combined 
with their mutual infuriation at mocking nicknames, are at least par-
tially transformed thanks to the secretive fun of code names that enable 
a joyful synesthetic moment which bonds a giggling sound to a fly-
coloured shape, and back to another sound. The shift from “S. Insect” to 
“Rahel” complicates this moment by suggesting that a different perspec-
tive has emerged, though it is unclear whether the code names “belong” 
to the narrator’s voice and real names to the children or vice versa. At 
the same time that the novel indicates a boundary shift between char-
acter and narrator, it shares a hyper-sensual moment across that bound-
ary. The novel’s formal emphasis, its changing repetitions and paratactic 
rhythms, gradually initiate the narrative’s affirmative relation to the 
kinds of delight—somatic pleasures and linguistic resonances—affili-
ated with constraint. Without insisting on the boundaries of narrato-
logical categories like character and narrator, or even the category of 
individual consciousness, the novel elevates the texture of subjectivity to 
the status of an aesthetic principle.
The style affiliated with childhood subjectivity posits play as a form 
of cultural agency—Rahel and Estha love to speak English forwards, 
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backwards, and in new combinations.10 Powerlessness and vulnerability 
make an early appearance in The God of Small Things when the twins 
are introduced as “[t]hin-armed children, flat-chested, wormridden and 
Elvis Presley-puffed” (4). If this representation of childhood seems es-
sentialist (though not idealized), then essence and authenticity as such 
are not, for Roy, problems. Roy’s disinterest in critiquing the authentic-
ity of a childlike perspective suggests her investment in the universality 
of childhood, and the novel’s valorization of this perspective works to 
reconnect us to our own receptivity.11 This is not a politically moti-
vated deconstruction of authenticity slipping up on its representation of 
childhood; rather, a shared phenomenology based on childhood sensi-
tivity drives the novel’s anti-politics. 
II.
Before describing the novel’s phenomenological aesthetic in more 
detail, I will first discuss the theoretical basis for reading the novel as 
engaged in aesthetics, a field that has not traditionally included sensu-
ally, personally-invested contemplation of natural phenomena within its 
scope. But the shift from the contemplation of art to the contemplation 
of nature is less fraught than might be expected. The prominence of 
the seemingly reifying term “things” for natural phenomena opens the 
novel to an aesthetic discourse that stresses embedded, embodied, and 
desiring spectatorship and retains the traditional notion of the nonin-
strumental object of contemplation. As Leela Gandhi argues, the scene 
of traditional Kantian aesthetics is one of disinterested spectatorship, 
but such an encounter between subject and object can be appropriated 
for an understanding of aesthetics that emphasizes the desire to bond 
with what remains outside the self. For Gandhi, this affective approach 
recoups the aesthetic as an experience of “interested autonomy” (160) 
that opens a range of possibilities for relationality, rendering the aes-
thetic amenable to anti-colonial politics, and, I would add, to ecological 
concerns. Similarly, Isobel Armstrong’s The Radical Aesthetic is suited 
to a discussion of Roy’s work because she conceives of “the compo-
nents of aesthetic life .  .  . [as] already embedded in the processes and 
practices of consciousness—playing and dreaming, thinking and feel-
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ing.” Childhood experience provides the basis for aesthetic experience: 
“Interactive, sensuous, epistemologically charged, play has to do with 
both the cognitive and the cultural” (2–3).12 Inherent in play is a learn-
ing process by which the child mediates his relationship to his environ-
ment and thus engenders knowledge. Art extends play, engaging the 
subject and environment, so aesthetic experience should be understood 
not as isolated perception, but as an elaboration of our earliest, rich-
est energies. Like Gandhi, who argues that Roy’s approach generates an 
“immature politics” (188), Armstrong leaves the political impact of aes-
thetic autonomy open-endedly relevant to “struggle” of all kinds (101, 
224).13 She argues that this is a democratic and feminist approach—
democratic in the sense that it takes into account somatic experience 
“available to the disempowered,” and feminist because it understands 
the “palpable materiality of the body” (15, 236)—because it reintegrates 
the disempowered, gendered body into aesthetic theory. These attempts 
to reclaim somatic experience resonate with Roy’s phenomenological ac-
count of powerlessness, which centres upon the palpable materiality of 
the shared thoughts and dreams of twinned bodies.
From this perspective, Roy’s fusion of wonder with beauty does not 
merely offer collective sensory consolation for a lack of agency.14 Rather, 
the novel posits this affective experience as an alternative form of knowl-
edge that complements critique but accomplishes something experi-
ential, and thus is more accessible as a form of protection against the 
traumas of social and cultural life. The narrator’s closeness to the charac-
ters supports the aesthetic centrality of affect, because “affects cross cat-
egories, experienced in consciousness and registered by the body” (108). 
Responding to the novel’s attempt to recapture a sensual world already 
lost, Deepika Bahri suggests that it can be described as working out, but 
in an elegiac mode, the Marxist concept of the emancipatory potential 
of sensory experience: “tension between the aesthetic and the political 
. . . reveals the contributions of the former in the face of the dominative 
logic of the latter, even as it underscores the importance of understand-
ing their separation and isolation from each other” (17). For Bahri, the 
novel exacerbates this tension by depicting sensuous plenitude as an ex-
perience of the past, as when the narrator comments that Rahel views 
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the experience of sharing thoughts and dreams with Estha as so removed 
from the present as to constitute a different form of identity—Rahel 
“thinks of Estha and Rahel as Them, because, separately, the two of them 
are no longer what They were” (5). However, because the third-person 
narrator shares and expands the experiences of characters, mourning the 
gap between the too-vivid past and unthinkable present cannot be the 
novel’s ultimate aim.
III.
At this point, the phenomenology Roy’s characters and narrator share 
needs further exploration. The perspective affiliated with the children 
is biologically oriented, on one hand, and animistic, on the other. It 
implies—though never makes explicit—the authenticity of biological 
interconnectedness as surpassing the claims of ideology.15 The twins’ 
imaginary version of what their uncle calls the History House has little 
to do with the anti-commodification critique of “Ayemenem’s own 
Heart of Darkness” offered by the narrator. As the twins imagine the 
History House together as if by an unspoken consensus, biology en-
croaches upon the relics of past life:
Very few people had seen it. But the twins could picture it.
The History House.
With cool stone floors and dim walls and billowing ship-
shaped shadows. Plump, translucent lizards lived behind old 
pictures, and waxy, crumbling ancestors with tough toe-nails 
and breath that smelled of yellow maps gossiped in sibilant, 
papery whispers. (51–52)
Although Lawrence Buell’s suggestion for ecocriticism that “the nonhu-
man environment is present not merely as a framing device but as a 
presence that begins to suggest that human history is implicated in a 
natural history” (7) is relevant here, the concept of history is itself over-
run by living multiplicity. Before contextualizing the juxtaposition of 
animals and history firmly within the imaginative world of the children, 
the novel keys this scenario of overlapping registers to its rejection of 
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boundaries that delimit identity, including the individual identities of 
twin children. 
The novel’s phenomenology is not limited to the characters and the 
narrator; by providing a sort of tutorial though two early scenes of per-
ceptual framing, the novel initiates readers into what Gandhi calls the 
desiring aesthetic gaze (160). First, describing the death of the adult 
Estha’s dog, Roy glosses the moment from Estha’s point of view:
As Khubchand lay dying on the cushion, Estha could see the 
bedroom window reflected in his smooth, purple balls. And 
the sky beyond. And once a bird that flew across. To Estha—
steeped in the smell of old roses, blooded on memories of a 
broken man—the fact that something so fragile, so unbearably 
tender had survived, had been allowed to exist, was a miracle. A 
bird in flight reflected in an old dog’s balls. It made him smile 
out loud. (14)
This passage introduces Estha’s sensibility: overlapping sense impres-
sions give the temporary and precarious appearance of overlapping 
bodies—it is an image, not properly a “thing” at all, that blends the 
discourse of ecology with that of art. It is not the potential symbolism 
of the bird in flight that interests Estha, but the dissonant framing of 
the image within another image. A special way of looking brings these 
beings together into one unfused experience that exemplifies Gandhi’s 
description of the aesthetic as interested autonomy: while the human 
gaze desires, organizes, values, and participates in the construction of 
the aesthetic object when the object is the living world, the world still 
retains its inhumanity.
A comparable moment occurs not much later, but at a fantasmatic 
remove that bridges real, remembered, and imagined perception. The 
narrator, here loosely affiliated with Rahel, describes the imagined view 
through the stretched piercings in her long-dead great-grandmother’s 
ears: “Through the holes in her ears you could see the hot river and the 
dark trees that bent into it. And the fishermen in their boats. And the 
fish” (30). The narrator provides no commentary on the preciousness 
of the imaginary glimpse of fish bodies experientially consecrated by 
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being framed in a dead woman’s imagined ears. These moments resist 
symbolic interpretation—they are simply living things, brought briefly 
together by a fusion of perception with imagination. This has ecological 
implications: the environment is not so “other” as to be closed off to 
the human observer, but the conjunction of “things” appears valuable as 
such. Seeing this way is intuitively and implicitly a way of participating 
in both historical inheritance and biological interconnection; writing 
this way offers an ecology of style that makes nature an artwork.
Roy does not appear to worry that the human construction of nature 
trespasses on nature’s otherness or essentializes it. Rather, she works to 
place the human viewer within rather than outside the environment. 
Unlike the static model of traditional aesthetics, this mode of perceptual 
imagination does not render the perceiver passive, or isolate the object 
in an aesthetic void. According to Armstrong’s theory of the aesthetic, 
objects of play mediate between the self and the world:
If we refuse to seal the artwork off into an aesthetic terrain, 
and regard the artwork, not the ‘I’ who supposedly made it, as 
a form of mediation, a transitive, interactive form, new pos-
sibilities emerge. For one thing, this will not allow the one-
sided, privileged term, self or ‘I’, to dominate what is a process 
of relating, a constant negotiation of in-betweenness. (159–60)
Because for Roy objects of perception tend to be configurations of 
plants and animals existing at the margins of an increasingly scarred 
natural world, the narrative intimates that these perceptions heighten 
the perceiver’s awareness of in her place in a world conceived ecologi-
cally as well as socially but without ever going so far beyond a child-like 
perspective as to theorize this stance explicitly. 
IV.
The subjectivity shared by Rahel and Estha,which pervades the novel 
even when the narrative dwells in the thoughts of other characters, is 
nonetheless not associated with transformative agency. As with the nov-
el’s rejection of boundaries at the outset, Estha’s retreat into silence indi-
cates that the processes of maturation and secondarily of enculturation 
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involve deeply traumatic encounters between childhood pliancy and the 
aggression of the adult world.16 Childhood subjectivity does not neces-
sarily disappear fully when one grows up, as the description of the “truly, 
terrifyingly adult” policemen implies. They are “men whom childhood 
had abandoned without a trace. Men without curiosity. Without doubt. 
. . . They looked out at the world and never wondered how it worked, 
because they knew. They worked it. They were mechanics who serviced 
different parts of the same machine” (248). It seems no accident that one 
of these policemen has casual access to Ammu’s body, tapping her breasts 
with his baton: these abuses result from subjectivity conceived of as a 
mechanical force, rather than as an opportunity for sensitive experience. 
Ammu herself seems to regress toward a perspective more like that of 
her children. Although at times she describes the world of childhood 
jealously, from the outside, her perspective seems susceptible to invasion 
by playful tropes that are explicitly linked to Rahel’s consciousness.17 
When she and her lover Velutha play with a spider at the novel’s end, 
her childlike qualities are clearest:
[T]he minute spider . . . lived in a crack in the wall of the back 
verandah of the History House and camouflaged himself by 
covering his body with bits of rubbish—a sliver of wasp wing. 
Part of a cobweb. Dust. Leaf rot. The empty thorax of a dead 
bee. Chappu Thamburan, Velutha called him. Lord Rubbish. 
One night they contributed to his wardrobe—a flake of garlic 
skin—and were deeply offended when he rejected it along with 
the rest of his armor from which he emerged—disgruntled, 
naked, snot-colored. (320)
The rhythm and cadence feel familiar at this point, as if the poetics of 
Rahel and Estha’s voices have fully pervaded their mother’s experiences. 
Moreover, the multiple layers protecting this ugly spider’s life embody 
the phenomenal multiplicity that Ammu and Velutha value by notic-
ing him. Their attention to the specifics of the spider’s life suggests that 
they are engaged in a playful, aesthetic act that levels human and insect 
importance. Almost the last moment of the novel, this passage, with 
its emphasis on play, seems more final but also more hopeless than the 
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sexually explicit description of their coupling a few pages earlier. While 
Ammu and Velutha delight in the spider’s dirtiness and their own abil-
ity to attend to it, the scene contains a hint of destruction appropri-
ate to the fact that, thanks to the novel’s nonlinear temporality, these 
characters have already lost their membership in society. In their retreat, 
Velutha and Ammu are certainly not effective agents of political change. 
Nor are they aware of the contingency of their attachments, as a cosmo-
politan reading might have it.
Even if her adult characters can retreat to their unsophisticated child-
hood notion of beauty at their most tender moments, Roy does not 
engage the concept of hybrid identity, the domain of postcolonial 
cosmopolitanism, but a more straightforward theory of development. 
Hybridity remains in play only as living multiplicity—only in the sense 
that Roy’s polyvocal strategy for evoking childhood wonder ends up 
celebrating ecology. Her multilayered voice reflects the diversity of ex-
perience available to the right kind of subject. But Roy resists giving the 
characters enough critical consciousness to let them theorize their stance 
explicitly. As far as the characters are concerned, the sensual experience 
itself is most important. Roy scripts this inadequate political agency by 
embodying aesthetic receptivity in characters whose anger remains per-
sonal. The introduction of the Big God and Small God emphasizes that 
worship of framed private experience results from trauma: 
[P]ersonal despair could never be desperate enough. That some-
thing happened when personal turmoil dropped by at the way-
side shrine of the vast, violent, circling, driving, ridiculous, 
insane, unfeasible, public turmoil of a nation. That Big God 
howled like a hot wind and demanded obeisance. Then Small 
God (cozy and contained, private and limited) came away cau-
terized, laughing at his own temerity. (20)
While the structure of characterization suggests feminist critique, the 
shift away from Rahel’s own anger produces an elevated account of gods 
that effaces cultural and sexual power. If Rahel takes offence, she offers 
no direct response. Politicization has disastrous effects, though the tragic 
valence of events upholds the rectitude of the politics (Khot 219). After 
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all, the God of Small Things is also a God of Loss: the rejection of the 
violence in grand narratives leaves behind a sensibility that does not 
directly map onto the capacity to effect social change.
V.
The trajectory of Roy’s career grafts a future onto the novel’s community, 
offering an opportunity to assess the futurism common to discussions 
of the aesthetic.18 Recent work in aesthetics tends to have a futurist 
emphasis derived from Giorgio Agamben’s concept of potentiality—
both Leela Gandhi’s “immature” “politics of relationality” (188) and 
Thomas Docherty’s “passion of the possible” avoid projecting the politi-
cal future of aesthetics. These writers derive their caution from drawing 
on Agamben’s interest in Walter Benjamin’s critique of the fascist uses of 
aestheticized politics. As Docherty argues, political forecasts risk judg-
ments that may too sharply define the objects of experience and impose 
authenticity from outside: “Our response, in our face-to-face encoun-
ter with such alterity, must be passionate, a ‘passion of the possible.’ It 
would be an error to assume a knowledge of this Other, for any such 
knowledge would be a resolution of the ambiguity that she presents into 
a closed and univocal meaning. . . . The ethical requires ‘negative capa-
bility’” (87). Because Roy is less concerned about preserving the authen-
ticity of otherness, however, she gestures to the openness in aesthetic 
experience without forestalling judgment or deferring engagement. To 
some extent, she would agree with Docherty that we need “a turn to 
ecology” in which “[t]he key term would thus not be ‘participation, but 
rather inhabiting,’ in .  .  . its ecological sense, as defining an intimacy 
with a public space or public sphere” (135).19 However, Roy’s active 
engagement rather than residence in a zone of potentiality means that 
while intimacy reaches cautiously toward the public sphere, “ecology” 
never loses its specific, environmental purchase. Thus, she neither cri-
tiques the cultural construction of nature, nor affirms the unapproach-
able otherness of the environment, but works within the perceiver’s de-
siring relationship to its beauty.
While active in protest, then, Roy depicts herself as motivated pri-
marily by the novel’s vision of “beauty” and its environmentalist im-
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plications. The God of Small Things is not autobiography—it seems 
impossible to imagine a future for Rahel—but the work has a nonliteral 
autobiographical element that comes into the foreground of Roy’s sub-
sequent political activism. The small living things that draw consistent 
attention in The God of Small Things recur in Roy’s political work, sug-
gesting that the phenomenology developed in the novel should be un-
derstood as signifying her characters’ incapacity for political action, but 
also as a fundamental source of imaginative value Roy shares with her 
characters and narrator, and which she brings to political projects that 
maintain explicitly literary qualities. If her protest writing insists that 
human lives are no more important than and dependent on other kinds 
of lives, her continued aesthetic emphasis attempts to make this rec-
ognition possible. “The End of the Imagination,” Roy’s first foray into 
political engagement, is dedicated to “Marmots and voles and everything 
else on earth that is threatened and terrorized by the human race” (Cost 92). 
Following much the same logic as the phenomenological tutorial in The 
God of Small Things, marmots reappear in her polemic against the U.S. 
invasion of Afghanistan, “War Is Peace.” Roy follows a discussion of 
collective resistance with unrestrained animal imagery: “[H]ave we for-
feited our right to dream? Will we ever be able to reimagine beauty? Will 
it be possible ever again to watch the slow, amazed blink of a new-born 
gecko in the sun, or whisper back to the marmot who has just whis-
pered in your ear—without thinking of the World Trade Center . . .?” 
(Cost 192).20 This too-precious image clearly does not represent political 
agency gained, but a post-traumatic conception of subjective “freedom 
from” cooptation. Roy’s use of “small things” in her description of what 
her political project seeks to preserve idealizes a separation between an 
anti-political perspective that can be conveyed by animal imagery and 
one that actively engages with politics and has little interest in rodents.
In Roy’s turn from writing fiction to political activism, she has fre-
quently juxtaposed these as two separate ways of life, highlighting her 
reluctance to hypothesize a politically active future for art as such. In 
some of her earliest political writing, she depicts herself as an artist 
wrenched out of a world bounded by the aims of art, pulled away from 
reading highbrow authors invested in literary aesthetics. “Instinct,” she 
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writes, “led me to set aside Joyce and Nabokov, . . . and substitute for it 
reports on drainage and irrigation, with journals and books and docu-
mentary films about dams and why they’re built and what they do” (Cost 
9). Roy portrays herself as a literary person, caught up in an instinctive 
and physical rather than rational sacrifice to boring but ethically all-too-
urgent debates. In “Come September” she writes, “fiction dances out 
of me. Nonfiction is wrenched out by the aching, broken world I wake 
up to every morning” (War Talk 45). Pointedly literary is the way Roy 
stages her political outrage autobiographically (Huggan, “‘Greening,’” 
709), coupling dissent to the personal act of turning away from art, and 
nostalgically imagining what it would be like to return after this long, 
painful separation. 
Most dramatically in “The Greater Common Good,” Roy stages a 
breakout from the mould of an empirically-minded protester. Telling 
the story of the villagers whose precarious but viable existence on the 
riverbanks of the Narmada Valley was destroyed by construction of the 
Sardar Sarovar Dam, she explains,
Suddenly they can’t trust their river any more. It’s like a loved 
one who has developed symptoms of psychosis. Anyone who 
has loved a river can tell you that the loss of a river is a terrible, 
aching thing. But I’ll be rapped on the knuckles if I continue in 
this vein. When we’re discussing the Greater Common Good 
there’s no place for sentiment. One must stick to facts. Forgive 
me for letting my heart wander. (Cost 50)
No longer concerned with data, Roy depicts herself as an erring child, to 
be disciplined for her impassioned sympathy by schoolmarmish protest-
ers who fear that to show personal emotion is to retreat from the suppos-
edly empirical world in which developers function. The implication of 
this moment, of course, is that far from frowning at her emotional out-
burst, her reader will realize the validity of her lament and embrace “the 
seeming inappropriateness of aesthetics in the context of waste and rup-
ture” (De Loughrey, Gosson, Handley, 23). This passage emphasizes that 
Roy conceives the essay in the literary terms of a project that should not 
bracket individual experience for the sake of a debate over water use.21 
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VI.
It might seem that Roy’s aesthetic has an infantilizing effect and unde-
sirably political implications. For one, it associates the victims of glo-
balization with children, which risks repeating the offences of imperial 
paternalism. Furthermore, its comfort with the concept of the natural 
also risks both essentialism and the casual assumption of human privi-
lege. Finally, its gestures of universalism seem to efface ongoing cultural 
and political debate. Instead, however, we might see it as avowing a 
tension, implying that political discourse will always involve psychologi-
cal elisions that make the representation of fervent emotional energies 
seem merely infantile or sentimental when they have the potential to 
unite the oppressed.22 But if Roy’s work constantly appears to flee its 
own commitments, it remains reluctantly engaged rather than escapist. 
In other words, although Roy’s writings, from The God of Small Things 
to the present, consistently divide the aesthetic and the political as the 
public from the private, her essays belie this division. By positioning her 
own politics as emerging from this phenomenology, which is not only 
anti-political but seems to negate political agency, Roy radicalizes her 
aesthetic. When writing concerns the relations between perception and 
identity, involving affect, gender, and species, it cannot but intersect 
with political—public—concerns. Her work’s autobiographical register, 
though, insists that political engagement cannot forget the intensity of 
individual experience, cannot allow this form of consciousness to lapse 
into the past. 
Perhaps, as Armstrong implies, affective aesthetics may only amount 
to a release from ideological blindness that has obscured the extent to 
which oppressed bodies are denied discursive presence; this new con-
ception of aesthetic experience offers the most inclusive paradigm, if 
not for achieving social justice than for understanding what political 
agency risks leaving behind, and thus it has feminist, environmentalist, 
and anti-globalization resonances. Roy cannot, then, permit the divi-
sion between art and politics to delay engagement. She highlights her 
lingering suspicion of directing an inclusive aesthetics toward political 
ends, but does so nonetheless. The need to bring aesthetics autonomy 
into political debate is, she suggests, at once to risk missing the point of 
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beauty and to fight to keep the experience of beauty available and un-
compromised. In other words, by engaging in protest, her political and 
especially ecological commitments retain their specificity, which might 
otherwise be lost by deferring political action to a potential future. She 
constantly foregrounds a sense of unreadiness, but some things, she im-
plies, cannot wait. 
Notes
  I am grateful for encouragement and assistance with development of this essay 
by Simon During, for generous and insightful draft readings by Robert Higney 
and Jason Swallow, and for the opportunity to present a version of this paper at 
University of California Riverside’s 2007 (dis)junctions conference.
 1 A number of writers of what Kumar terms “World Bank literature” (xii) prefer 
to retain the word “empire,” perhaps for its associations with extreme power 
differential and long histories of exploitation. See “Confronting Empire” where 
Roy argues, “[o]ur strategy should be not only to confront empire, but to lay 
siege to it. . . . With out art, our music, our literature, our stubbornness, our joy, 
our brilliance, our sheer relentlessness—and our ability to tell our own stories. 
Stories that are different from the ones we’re being brainwashed to believe” (War 
Talk 112). 
 2 While Sedgwick is discussing not aesthetics but Michel Foucault’s reification of 
the categories he critiques, her context is relevant here in that I will argue for the 
limited productivity of applying poststructuralist approaches to an aestheticist 
novel.
 3 In Mortenson’s reading of Roy, “[t]here is no escape back to pristine nature, but 
at the same time there is no denying the ecological networks in which human 
beings are imbricated” (189). In this essay I build on the idea that Roy’s ultimate 
commitment is ecological rather than cultural by connecting this idea to Roy’s 
narrative strategies in a more detailed way than Mortenson.
 4 Roy links “the unrelenting accretion of human suffering and its cauterization 
of human sensibility” (Bahri 222). Roy’s emphasis on a shared-yet-private per-
ceptual framework echoes Chakrabarty’s projections about postcolonial nations 
which have not had access to dominant models of nationhood, citizenship, or 
subjectivity, which will “write over the given and privileged narratives of citizen-
ship other narratives of human connections that draw sustenance from dreamed-
up pasts and futures where collectivities are defined neither by the rituals of 
citizenship nor by the nightmare of ‘tradition’ that ‘modernity’ creates” (46).
 5 For Singh, “[I]f the children grow up, they remain mere shadows of their former 
childhood selves and make rather unconvincing adults. The memory that is sus-
tained is of a sacred world of lost innocence and childhood” (14). Singh goes on 
178
El i sh a  Cohn
to argue that the novel’s “trenchant critiques of the nation-state remain circum-
scribed by refusing to let [the] children grow up to negotiate complex relation-
ships with the histories that interpellate them” (17). This refusal, I argue, is part 
of Roy’s ambivalence toward aesthetics in politics.
 6 See, for example, Ahmad, 103–108.
 7 Huggan, concerned at India becoming “an object of conspicuous consumption,” 
argues that Roy writes with awareness of her novel’s position, using “strategic 
exoticism” to “reveal the link between the perceptual mechanism of the exotic 
and the metropolitan marketing of Indian culture” (83, 71). However, from this 
perspective Roy’s self-awareness about such a mechanism does not redeem it 
from complicity, and damages the potency of its protests. Bacchilega also worries 
this idea from a feminist perspective (181).
 8 See Anderson for a discussion of tensions within cosmopolitanism: critical 
self-reflection that accompanies voluntary affiliation typifies cosmopolitanism, 
which manifests “discomfort with a too-explicit affirmation of the universalism 
that nonetheless prompts suspicions of ‘overly relativized preciousness’ or ‘local 
authenticity’” (81). Roy, as I will argue, embraces both universalism and local 
authenticity, which clearly distinguishes her stance from cosmopolitanism.
 9 For Benoit, Roy’s “deconstructionist tactics force the reader to fit the kaleido-
scopic pieces together into some sort of coherent ‘whole’, and this act of im-
agination blurs the dividing line between author and reader” (106). See also 
Vogt-William, 393–404.
 10 They might derive their verbal cleverness from their native language, Malayalam 
(a palindrome). However, the narrative, instead of pinning down the cultural 
sources of play, instead stresses the universality of childhood. It is worth men-
tioning that the forms of phenomenological multiplicity Roy offers depend 
heavily on familiar, modernist versions of childhood, which include an asso-
ciative, punning sensibility. While it might be possible to see this adoption of 
Western narrative techniques as another semi-subversive cosmopolitan adapta-
tion of available means to deconstructive ends (as is often said of Rushdie, fre-
quently mentioned in discussions of Roy’s precursors), the novel’s adoption of 
modes of awareness affiliated with childhood suggests otherwise. 
 11 For an example of the deconstruction of childhood, see Morgado, 206. 
 12 Armstrong also notes that “it is crucial that play continues into adulthood” (39). 
 13 Armstrong emphasizes that her theory is particularly useful in explicitly antago-
nistic situations and selects the postcolonial experience as a paradigmatic exam-
ple because if play alters categories and frees up language, “[i]n the context of 
post-colonial writing, resignification of cultural and sexual meaning is an ardu-
ous and agonistic process, a violent event in the sign system . . . , paralleled by 
political upheaval which is as much cause as effect of discursive change” (232).
 14 Nussbaum’s discussion of wonder illuminates the sense in which Roy formulates 
experience collectively rather than individually: “The impulse of wonder and the 
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ability to imagine another’s pain work closely together, since wonder turns the 
child outside herself to involve her with lives she doesn’t know” (213). However, 
Roy does not share Nussbaum’s liberal confidence that wonder has an impact on 
ethical behavior—for Roy, the geopolitical world abuses the capacity for wonder 
rather than extending it. 
 15 Roy saves explaining biological interconnection for her political work, allowing 
it to play an aesthetic role in the novel. See Roy’s “The Greater Common Good”: 
“[Big Dams] represent the severing of the link, not just the link—the under-
standing—between human beings and the planet they live on. They scramble 
the intelligence that connects eggs to hens, milk to cows, food to forests, water 
to rivers, air to life, and the earth to human existence” (Cost 81). 
 16 Franz Fanon suggests that children’s enculturation into racial identities may be 
traumatic (145–52). Natov’s comment that Roy’s “sharp insight into the intui-
tive nature of children revealing how innocence, unmarred by the infected sys-
tems of adult society and without full awareness, speaks truth to power” (196) 
responds to the text’s tendency to posit the modes of childhood subjectivity as 
an alternative source of value, though without considering its aesthetic implica-
tions.
 17 As an example of the infiltration of Rahel’s experience, while dreaming, Ammu 
asks, “Who was he, the one-armed man. Who could he have been? The God of 
Loss? The God of Small Things? The God of Goosebumps and Sudden Smiles? 
Of Sourmetal Smells—like steel bus rails and the smell of the bus conductor’s 
hands from holding them?” (207). Bus smells intrude into Ammu’s dream out 
of Rahel’s perceptually hybrid experience in the first chapter: “Rahel could smell 
the sheaf of bus tickets and the sourness of the steel bus rails on the conductor’s 
hands” (10), an experience that re-echoes in Rahel’s consciousness before appear-
ing in Ammu’s.
 18 I am grateful for this point to a number of talks sponsored by the Johns Hopkins 
English Department throughout the past year, specifically Brennan and Ander-
son. They deem this reluctance to envision a viable politics an escapist, utopian 
impulse. 
 19 For a similar use of the word “ecology,” see Massumi, who advocates an “in-
clusive, non-judgmental approach to tending belonging-together in an intense, 
affectively engaged way is an ethics—as opposed to a morality. Political ecology 
is an amoral collective ethics. Ethics is a tending of coming-together, a caring for 
belonging as such” (255). See also Sedgwick, 118, 145–6.
 20 I must admit that I find the description of the marmot sentimental and not very 
compelling. See my brief discussion of Roy’s infantilizing of political discourse 
in the conclusion.
 21 At the same time, Roy participates in a discourse of South Asian history that 
centres around ideologically fraught contests over water use. On the importance 
of water use in South Asian political history, see Arnold and Guha, 12–16.
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 22 Regardless of whether Roy appears aware of this logic, her writing makes senti-
mentality seem the result of oppressive anti-emotionalism. 
Works Cited
Ahmad, Aijaz. “Reading Arundhati Roy Politically,” Frontline 14.15 July 26-Aug. 8 
(1997): 103–08.
Anderson, Amanda. “Cosmopolitanism, Universalism, and the Divided Legacies of 
Modernity.” The Way We Argue Now. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. 69–92.
Armstrong, Isobel. The Radical Aesthetic. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
Arnold, David and Ramachandra Guha. Eds. “Introduction: Themes and Issues in 
the Environmental History of South Asia.” Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays 
on the Environmental History of South Asia. Delhi: Oxford UP, 1995.
Bahri, Deepika. Native Intelligence: Aesthetics, Politics, and Postcolonial Literature. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2003. 
Benoit, Madhu. “Circular Time: A Study of Narrative Techniques in Arundhati 
Roy’s The God of Small Things.” World Literature Written in English 38.1 (1999): 
98–106.
Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Buell, Lawrence. The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the 
Formation of American Culture. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. 
DeLoughrey, Elizabeth M., Reneé K. Gosson, and George B. Handley. “Intro-
duction.” Caribbean Literature and the Environment: Between Nature and 
Culture. Ed. DeLoughrey, Gosson, and Handley. Charlottesville: U of Virginia 
P, 2005. 1–30.
Fanon, Franz. Black Skin White Masks. Trans. Charles Lam Markmann. New York: 
Grove Press, 1967. 
Huggan, Graham. “‘Greening’ Postcolonialism: Ecocritical Perspectives.” Modern 
Fiction Studies 50.3 (2004): 701–33.
——. The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins. London: Routledge, 2001.
Khot, Mohini. “The Feminist Voice in Arundhati Roy’s The God of Small Things.” 
Indian Feminisms. Ed. Jasbir Jain and Avadhesh Kumar Singh. New Delhi: 
Creative Books, 2001. 213–22.
Kumar, Amitava. World Bank Literature. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2003.
Morgado, Margarida. “The Season of Play: Constructions of the Child in the 
English Novel.” Children in Culture: Approaches to Childhood. Ed. Karín Lesnik-
Oberstein. Basingstoke: Macmillan P, 1998. 196–211.
Mortenson, Peter. “‘Civilization’s Fear of Nature’: Postmodernity, Culture and 
Environment in The God of Small Things.” Beyond Postmodernism: Reassessments 
in Literature, Theory, and Culture. Ed. Klaus Stierstorfer. Berlin: de Gruyter, 
2003. 179–95.
181
Arundha t i  Roy ' s  Eco logy  o f  St y l e
Natov, Roni. “The Contemporary Child in Adult Literature.” The Poetics of 
Childhood. New York: Routledge, 2003. 191-218. 
Roy, Arundhati. The Cost of Living. New York: Modern Library, 1999. 
——. The God of Small Things. New York: Harper Perennial, 1997. 
——. Power Politics. Cambridge, MA: South End P, 2001.
——. “War is Peace.” The Power of Nonviolence: Writings by Advocates of Peace. Ed. 
Howard Zinn. Boston: Beacon P, 2002. 182–92.
——. War Talk. Cambridge, MA: South End P, 2003. 
Singh, Sujala. “Postcolonial Children: Representing the Nation in Arundhati Roy, 
Bapsi Sidhwa, and Shyam Selvadurai.” Wasafiri 14 (2004): 13–8. 
Tickell, Alex. “The God of Small Things: Arundhati Roy’s Postcolonial Cosmopoli-
tanism.” J of Commonwealth Literature 38.1 (2003): 73–89. 
Vogt-William, Christine. “‘Language is the skin of my thought’: Language Relations 
in Ancient Promises and The God of Small Things.” The Politics of English as a 
World Language: New Horizons in Postcolonial Cultural Studies. Ed. Christian 
Mair. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2003. 393–404.
